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The Part-Time Pay Penalty in a Segmented Labor Market
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While much of the literature that investigates the part-time (PT) / full-time (FT) hourly wage 
differential and its causes focuses on average effects, very few studies analyze the 
heterogeneous effects of PT work across different subgroups, despite the policy relevance of 
understanding channels behind the (raw) PT penalty in different labor markets. This paper is 
the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women’s subsequent 
earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixed-term. Using 
a 21-year unbalanced Social Security records panel of over 76,000 prime-aged women 
strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work aggravates the 
segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this penalty is larger 
and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts. The paper discusses 
problems arising in empirical estimation, and how to address them. It concludes with policy 
implications relevant for Continental Europe and its dual structure of employment protection. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J13, J16, J21, J22, J31, J62, C23 
  
Keywords:  fixed-term and permanent contract, hourly wage levels and growth, 
prime-aged women, fixed-effects estimator, differential measurement error of  





Núria Rodríguez-Planas  
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) 
Department of Economics and Economic History 
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès) 
Barcelona 
Spain 
E-mail: Nuria.Rodriguez@uab.es       
 
                
 
                                                 
* Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (grant SEJ2006-712) and the 
Generalitat de Catalunya (grant SGR2005-712) is also gratefully acknowledged.   2 
I.  Introduction 
In the light of the recent surge in PT employment in many industrialized countries, and 
the relative concentration of women in PT jobs (making the issue a major one in gender 
equality), many researchers have increasingly become interested in analyzing the hourly 
wage differential between PT female workers and their FT counterparts and its causes.
1  
To disentangle the channels through which the (raw) PT pay penalty emerges is the first 
step  for  designing  policies  which  aim  at  improving  the  conditions  of  PT  workers 
(Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).  Given the policy relevance of this line of research, it 
comes as a surprise the little attention there has been, thus far, on the differential effect 
of PT work on wages across different population subgroups, as the underlying forces 
behind the PT pay penalty may differ drastically in different labor markets leading to 
distinct policy recommendations.
2 
At the same time, there is a growing concern among academics, politicians and 
practitioners,  that  the  path  of  partial  reforms  taken  by  many  Continental  European 
countries,  such  as  France,  Germany,  Portugal,  Italy,  and  Spain,  over  the  last  three 
decades of maintaining strong employment protection for regular jobs while attempting 
at establishing more flexible but marginal labor market segments has resulted in a dual 
labor  market  and  has  deepened  the  segmentation  between  ‘insiders’  (those  with 
permanent contracts involving high level of employment protection, decent jobs and 
generous benefits) and ‘outsiders’ (those with fixed-term contracts leading to poor labor 
                                                 
1 See Jones and Long, 1979; Blank, 1990; Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Montgomery and Cosgrove, 1995; 
Jepsen, 2001; Wolf, 2002; Hu and Tijdens, 2003; Rodgers, 2004; Jepsen et al., 2005; Hardoy and Schøne, 
2006; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; and Connolly and Gregory, 2009, among others. 
2 A possible  explanation for this is that most studies (especially in Europe) rely  on relatively  small 
sample sizes of individuals who work PT making difficult the heterogeneity analysis.  We have identified 
the following exceptions: Mocan and Tekin, 2003, analyze the nonprofit sector dimension; O’Connell 
and Gash, 2003, focus on differences between skilled and unskilled workers; and Ferber and Waldfogel, 
1998; Rodgers, 2004; Booth and Wood, 2008; Hirsch, 2005; O’Dorchai et al., 2007; and Mumford and 
Smith, 2007, study the gender dimension (or focus on male workers).    3 
market perspectives and low remuneration).
3  Clearly, analyzing the PT / FT hourly 
wage differential and understanding the underlying channels behind the (possible) PT 
penalties in these two segments of the labor market ought to be of most relevance for 
policy  making  in  countries  with  a  high  share  of  unemployment  and  stringent 
employment protection legislation.  This is the central point of this article.   
Our paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for 
women’s  subsequent  earnings  trajectories  from  the  dual  labor  market  employment 
protection perspective, by analyzing the PT pay penalty and its cause across two groups 
of workers, those with and without a permanent contract.  We focus on adult women 
between 24 and 45 years old and strongly attached to the Spanish labor market and use 
a  rich  longitudinal  dataset  obtained  from  the  Social  Security  records  that  covers 
employment  history  from  1985  to  2006,  and  has  only  recently  been  available  to 
researchers in Spain.
4  
Our paper brings to light that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor 
market insofar the detrimental effects of PT work are considerably bigger and more 
persistent  for  workers  under  a  fixed-term  contract  compared  to  workers  with  a 
permanent one.  More precisely, we find evidence of a PT penalty both in wage levels 
and in wage growth of a greater magnitude for workers with fixed-term contracts than 
those  with  a  permanent  one.  After  accounting  for  workers’  observable  and 
unobservable characteristics, we find that PT women with permanent contracts have 
wages that are, on average, 9 log points lower and grow 2.9 log points less per year 
than  wages of  FT counterparts.  For women with  fixed-term contracts, the PT pay 
                                                 
3  See  Bentolila  and  Dolado,  1994;  Blanchard  and  Landier,  2002;  Dolado,  et  al.,  2002;  Cahuc  and 
Kramarz, 2004; Beninger, 2005; Eichhorst, 2007; and Dolado, et al., 2007, among others.  
4 Although several papers have used longitudinal data to estimate the PT pay penalty (Blank, 1998; 
Hirsch, 2005; and Booth and Wood, 2008, among others), very few have more than two decades of 
data allowing them to observe women extended labor market history (see for instance, Connolly and 
Gregory, 2009).   4 
penalty is more than twice as large, 23 log points, and wages grow 3.9 log points less 
per year than wages of FT counterparts.  To put the estimates of wage growth into 
context, their size ranges between one-and-a-half and twice the size of the estimated 
college premium on wage growth. Thanks to the richness of our dataset, our estimates 
control  for  workers’  socio-demographic  characteristics,  employer’s  characteristics, 
workers’ previous employment history, and workers’ unobserved heterogeneity.  
The paper also discusses problems arising in empirical estimation, and how to 
address them.  In particular, one contribution of our paper is to uncover an empirical 
problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of 
the LHS variable by PT status. We use an alternative dataset (the Time Use Survey), to 
compare  contractual  hours  with  actual  hours  worked  and  show  that  PT  workers 
consistently work a greater number of hours in excess of contractual hours relative to 
their FT counterparts.
5  The result of this measurement error in contractual hours is to 
bias  upwards  the  hourly  wages  of  PT  workers  (relative  to  FT  workers)  leading  to 
underestimating  the  PT  wage  penalty.
6    To  address  this  problem,  we  follow  two 
different strategies.  First, we use imputed effective hours to obtain an estimate of the 
PT / FT wage differential in levels.  Second, we focus our attention on the wage change 
as opposed to wage level, and drop from our sample of analysis the observations of 
wage  change  observed  exactly  when  status  changes.
7    Assuming  that  differential 
measurement error by PT status is an individual-employment-status fixed-effect, our 
approach circumvents the problem of differential measurement effect and informs us on 
whether the PT status also implies a penalty in the subsequent growth of wages.   
                                                 
5 The measurement error in contractual hours can be explained by employers having an incentive to 
underreport contractual hours to reduce total labor costs, and being able to act upon it in a much easier 
way for PT jobs (since they are less protected by the law and the unions) than for FT jobs.   
6 As our data comes for Social Security records, we use contractual monthly wages and hours to calculate 
the hourly wages. 
7 For most (96%) of our sample of individuals who switched to PT employment, we observe them several 
years in either status.  Therefore individuals’ attrition because of this restriction is practically negligible.    5 
Spain  is  a  suitable  case  to  investigate  this  issue  because  of  the  striking 
segmentation of its labor market.
8  The Spanish unemployment rate has been extremely 
high (as much as one fifth of the labor force) for almost two decades (during the 1980s 
and 1990s), and it is currently, at 18%, the highest in Europe.  In addition, an important 
dual labor market developed after legislation changes in 1984, resulting in the economy 
with the highest rate of fixed-term contracts in Europe for the last two decades (over 
one third of all contracts are fixed-term contracts).  Finally, the issue is particularly 
timely  as  the  Spanish  Prime  Minister,  following  other  industrialized  countries’ 
practices, is proposing to promote the use of PT work to fight unemployment, arguing 
that it will add flexibility in the labor market.  
This paper is closer to Connolly and Gregory, 2009, (hereafter, CG) in that it 
examines the implications of switching to PT work for women’s subsequent earnings 
trajectories  using  a  long  unbalanced  panel  and  a  fixed-effects  `within´  estimator 
approach.  Methodologically, our work differs from CG study in the following three 
ways: First, we estimate the differential PT pay penalty by type of contract.  Second, 
we are able to distinguish between the PT pay penalty and the `motherhood pay gap´, as 
our  data  contains  information  on  children  in  the  household  (whereas  CG  cannot 
distinguish  between  mothers  and  non-mothers).    Third,  we  identify  and  address  a 
methodological  issue  regarding  differential  measurement  error  in  the  dependent 
variable.  While our findings for the primary labor market are consistent with those 
found by Connolly and Gregory, 2008 and 2009, and Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, in 
the UK and Hirsch, 2005, in the US, our work brings to light that in addition to the 
conventional channels behind the PT penalty, workers from the secondary labor market 
                                                 
8 See for instance, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994; Adam, 1996; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Galdón-
Sánchez and Güell, 2003; and Güell and Petrongolo, 2007, among others.   6 
suffer  a  further  unexplained  loss  due  to  the  PT  status  switch  itself,  in  addition  to 
experiencing negative returns to PT work.
9 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents an overview of the 
literature.  Section III describes the Spanish economic and institutional background.  
Section  IV  presents  the  data  and  the  descriptive  statistics.    Section  V  explains  the 
methodological  approach  and  analyzes  the  results.    Section  VI  concludes  with  a 
discussion on policy implications.  
 
II.  Literature on PT Earnings Penalty 
Many researchers have increasingly become interested in analyzing the hourly 
wage differential between PT female workers and their FT counterparts.  While the 
earliest studies focused on the US (Jones and Long, 1979; Blank, 1990) and the UK 
(Ermisch  and  Wright,  1993),  the  more  recent  literature  has  evaluated  the  PT  pay 
penalty in many industrialized countries, such as Australia (Rodgers, 2004), Belgium 
(Jepsen,  2001;  and  Jepsen  et  al.,  2005),  Norway  (Hardoy  and  Schøne,  2004),  The 
Netherlands (Hu and Tijdens, 2003); and West Germany (Wolf, 2002), among others.  
Most studies find a negative unadjusted PT wage gap (a PT pay penalty), the magnitude 
of which differs substantially across the different countries.  In some studies—such as, 
Rodgers, 2004; Jepsen, 2001; Jepsen et al., 2005; Hardoy and Schøne, 2004; Muñoz de 
Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008; and Manning and Petrongolo, 2008—, the PT pay penalty 
vanishes  or  becomes  small  when  controlling  for  differences  in  workers  and  job 
characteristics (especially education and occupation).  In other studies (Gallie et al., 
1998; Gornich and Jacobs, 1996; Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, 1990), a wage gap remains 
and this unexplained part also shows considerable cross-country variation.  Finally, in a 
                                                 
9 In the primary labor market, we find that the PT penalty is fully explained by the change of employer, 
negligible returns to PT work experience, and job downgrading   7 
third group of studies, a PT pay premium is found (Booth and Wood, 2008; Pissarides 
et al., 2005; and Pagán Rodríguez, 2007).
10   
While  some  of  the  differences  in  the  results  are  explained  by  countries’ 
institutional  and  cultural  differences,  and  the  amount  of  information  available  on 
workers, jobs, and labor market characteristics in the different datasets used; several 
identification problems within this literature are difficult to overcome.  Most of this 
literature compares the hourly wages of PT female workers with those of FT female 
workers  after  controlling  for  all  observable  characteristics,  acknowledging  that 
unobserved heterogeneity may still prevail, as women deciding to work PT may have 
different tastes and preferences about work than do women who work FT.  As Hakim 
(1997) explains, while some women are committed to careers in the labor market, a 
second  group  of  women  are  qualitatively  different  since  they  give  priority  to  their 
domestic roles and activities, do not invest in what economists term ‘human capital’ 
even if they acquire education qualifications, transfer quickly and permanently to part-
time  work as soon as a breadwinner husband permits it, choose undemanding jobs 
‘with  no  worries  or  responsibilities’  when  they  do  work,  and  are  hence  found 
concentrated in lower paid and lower grade jobs which offer convenient working hours 
with which they [are] satisfied. (Hakim, 1997, p. 43).  If there are unobserved quality 
differences between PT and FT workers, results from cross-sectional studies of the PT 
wage effect will reflect an omitted variable bias.  Nevertheless, many of the studies on 
the PT wage effect have been estimated on cross-sectional samples—see, for example, 
Simpson,  1986;  Blank,  1990;  and  Hotchkiss,  1991;  Ermisch  and  Wright,  1993; 
Rodgers, 2004; Pagán Rodríguez, 2007; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Mumford and 
Smith, 2008, among others.   
                                                 
10 A detailed discussion on the few studies that have analyzed the PT hourly wage differential in Spain 
can be found in the next section, which describes the Spanish economic and institutional background 
(Section III) and in the results section (Section V.1).   8 
One way to address the unobserved heterogeneity problem is to use panel data 
and to estimate a fixed-effects-‘within’ estimator, in which case, the effect of PT on 
wages is identified through those workers who switch status (see Booth and Wood, 
2008;  and  Connolly  and  Gregory,  2009).
11    While  having  important  advantages, 
longitudinal analysis is not without shortcomings.  A frequent problem arises when 
there is a small sample size of switchers, especially due to the infrequent transitions 
between FT to PT work and vice-versa, questioning the external validity of the results.  
In  addition,  measurement  errors  of  hours  and  wages,  which  are  common  in  this 
literature (Altonji  1986; Bound et al., 2001), bias OLS estimates towards zero and 
magnify the attenuation bias in a fixed-effects context (Aaronson and French, 2004; 
Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).  
Given that most studies use worker’ survey data, measurement errors of key 
variables is a frequent concern in this literature.  For instance, the OECD, 2002, warns 
about the possibility of having measurement errors in the survey stemming from the 
fact that the interviewed persons provide direct information about their own wages, 
rather than their employers, as is the case with matched employer-employee data or 
social  security  records.    Others  have  raised  similar  concerns  (see  for  instance, 
Pissarides  et  al.,  2005;  Mocan  and  Tekin,  2003;  or  Buligescu  et  al.,  2009).    Most 
recently,  Buligescu et al., 2009, find that reported actual working  hours, which are 
usually observed only for one week, show considerable dispersion and are likely to 
induce spurious negative correlation between working hours and the calculated wage 
rate.  They argue that it is better to use contractual hours as they do not tend to vary as 
much from week to week.  Some efforts to reduce the effect of measurement error in 
reported  hours  worked  (and  consequently  PT  status)  include  instrumenting  such 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, Hirsch (2005) uses multiple short panels with two observations per worker (one year 
apart) to estimate the effect of switching between FT and PT status on wage changes.     9 
variables with their  lags.  However, the results indicate that the  instruments do not 
always  seem  to  work  as  they  are  fairly  similar  to  OLS  estimates  for  some  of  the 
countries (Pissarides et al., 2005). 
Another  important  identification  problem  is  the  danger  of  reverse  causation: 
maybe it is low wages that ‘cause’ PT work, not PT work that ‘causes’ low wages.  
This  problem  is  usually  addressed  by  using  an  instrumental  variables  strategy.  
However, for this technique to work well requires a variable that affects propensity to 
work PT but does not have a direct effect on earnings.  Unfortunately, such a variable is 
extremely difficult to find.  And albeit children and marital status are frequently used as 
variables affecting the decision to work PT but not the wages earned—see Ermisch and 
Wright, 1993; Blank, 1998; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, among others—, it is well 
established  in this  literature that “this is a very strong assumption that may not, in 
reality, be any better than the exogeneity assumption that this is supposed to replace” 
(Manning and Petrongolo, page F33, Economic Journal 2008).  Aaronson and French, 
2004, are the only ones that we know of to use an alternative instrument for worked 
hours, the work disincentive of the Social Security system.  They are able to isolate 
exogenous shifts into PT employment resulting from changes in Social Security rules 
for older males.  
In our paper, we account for worker unobserved heterogeneity by exploiting a 
rich longitudinal dataset that covers employment history from 1985 to 2006, and has 
only recently been available to researchers in Spain.  In addition, as our data comes for 
Social Security records, we use contractual monthly wages and hours to calculate the 
hourly wages, eliminating the problem of measurement error due to recall bias or non-
response.   We do not model selection  into PT employment.  Therefore, we do not 
strictly identify the causal impact on wages or wage growth of working PT.  However,   10 
considering  that  longitudinal  estimates  more  closely  approximate  average  treatment 
effects  among  the  treated  than  among  random  draws  from  the  population  (Hirsch, 
2005), we believe that our estimates address some of the issues raised in this literature 
and bring new evidence on the situation of PT workers in segmented labor markets in 
general, and in Spain, more specifically.  
 
III.  Economic and Institutional Background  
The two most common forms of flexible work arrangements (fixed-term contracts and 
PT work) have evolved quite differently in Spain over the last two decades.  Both types 
of contracts were first regulated by law in 1984 with the objective of adding flexibility 
and  promoting  employment  in  a  rigid  labor  market  with  stringent  employment 
protection legislation and high levels of unemployment.  While fixed-term employment 
soared, the growth in PT employment was modest, at most.  As a result, since the early 
1990s, fixed-term employment represents one third of the Spanish labor force (by far, 
the highest share among European countries), whereas the share of PT employment is 
below one tenth of the labor force (far from the EU average of 18%).   
The surge of fixed-term contracts began to be questioned in the late-1980s when 
experts started to advise against the risk of segmentation with “good” (permanent) jobs 
and “bad” (fixed-term) jobs—Segura et al., 1991; Bentolila and Dolado, 1992; Jimeno 
and Toharia, 1993; and Dolado et al., 2002.  The concern was that the Spanish labor 
market  would  become  a  dual  labor  market  with  workers  with  fixed-term  contracts 
holding unstable, low protected and poorly paid jobs, while workers with indefinite 
contracts enjoyed protection and presumably also higher wages.  The reforms of 1994 
and  1997  aimed  to  enhance  the  use  of  permanent  contracts  and  reduce  its  cost.    11 
However, both reforms were quite unsuccessful at reducing the  share of temporary 
contracts in the labor force—see Kugler et al., 2002, and Dolado et al., 2002.   
In Spain, women are over-represented in both types of work arrangements, part-
time and fixed-term.  For example, 41% of contracts among women in Spain are fixed-
term compared to 35% among men, and 23% of women work in PT jobs compared to 
4% of men (LFS, 2005).  While women’s role in home production may imply that 
women have stronger preferences than men for PT jobs, this does not necessarily imply 
gender  differences  for  fixed-term  contracts  (as  a  permanent  contract  is  at  least  as 
desirable  as  a  temporary  one,  given  that  it  would  commit  the  firm  rather  than  the 
worker to costly procedures in case of separation).  Using data from the 1994 through 
1999 waves of the European Community Household Panel Survey, Pissarides et al., 
2005, find evidence suggesting that the unequal allocation of genders across fixed-term 
contracts and PT work in Spain  stems  from employer discrimination as opposed to 
workers’  comparative  advantage.    They  find  that,  after  controlling  for  comparative 
advantages by conditioning the likelihood of being in involuntary PT work on human 
capital and family characteristics, single women in Spain are 10% more likely to be 
involuntary PT workers than single men.  Similarly, they find that fixed-term contracts 
are 4% more frequent among single women than single men in Spain, and that family 
ties reinforces this tendency, with married women with children being about 9% more 
likely than married men to hold a fixed-term contract.  In addition, exploring workers’ 
preferences, these authors do not find evidence that women are particularly happier (or 
less unhappy) than men on PT jobs or with fixed-term contracts, as they find that PT   12 
jobs (fixed-term contracts) in Spain tend to reduce both males’ and females’ overall job 
satisfaction by 16% (25%).
12   
The evidence on wage differences by type of contract or PT status has been 
scarce  in  Spain  (mainly  due  to  the  lack  of  large  databases  containing  individual 
information on wages until recently), and based on cross-sectional analysis.  Given that 
wages are set by collective agreements and that these do not allow workers to be paid 
differently  on  type  of  contract,  it  seems  reasonable  to think  that  employers  do  not 
discriminate against workers by type of contract.  Despite this fact, several empirical 
studies find that permanent workers earn around 10% more, for men, and about 5% 
more,  for women,  after controlling  for observed heterogeneity  in personal and  job-
related characteristics and for selection into type of contract (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; 
Hernanz, 2002; and De la Rica, 2004).  Moreover, there is evidence that workers with 
fixed-term  contracts  segregate  into  low-paying  firms  and  occupations  (De  la  Rica, 
2004).  Turning to the evidence on PT / FT wage differential, the evidence on wage 
differences  between  PT  and  FT  workers  in  Spain  has  found  that  there  is  an 
‘unexpected’ (in the  light of the anecdotal  evidence and  job  satisfaction  indicators) 
wage premium to working PT (Pagán Rodríguez, 2007), or no effect (Pissarides et al., 
2005, and Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008).  However, failure of correcting for 
unobserved heterogeneity and measurement problems raise caution before taking these 
estimates at face value—as acknowledged by Pissarides et al., 2005. 
 
IV.  The Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We  use  data  from  the  2006  wave  of  the  Continuous  Sample  of  Working  Histories 
(hereafter  CSWH),  which  is  a  4%  non-stratified  random  sample  of  the  population 
                                                 
12 While many studies from developed countries find a preference for part-time work among women 
(Booth and van Ours. 2008 ; Gregory and Connolly, 2008 ; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004), no 
such effect is found in East Germany or France (Clark and Senik, 2006) or Honduras (López et al., 2009).    13 
registered with the Social Security Administration in 2006.
13  The CSWH consists of 
nearly 1.1 million individuals and provides the complete labor market history of the 
selected individuals back to 1967.  It provides information on: (1) socio-demographic 
characteristics of the worker (such as, sex, education, nationality, province of residence, 
number o children in the household and date of birth); (2) worker’s job information 
(such as, the type of contract—fixed-term versus permanent contract—, the PT status, 
the occupation, and the dates the employment spell started and ended, and the monthly 
earnings);  (3) employer’s information (such as, industry—defined at the three-digits 
Spanish classification code or NACE—, public versus private sector—, the number of 
workers of the firm, and the location—at the province level).  Although not reported in 
the CSWH, other variables such as working experience (in FT and PT work) and tenure 
can be easily calculated.  These data can be matched to data from the 2006 Spanish 
Municipal  Registry  of  Inhabitants,  which  portrays  information  on  the  individual’s 
education level, and number and date of birth of each of the members in the household.   
Following CG, we restrict our sample to women whose full labor market history 
to date can be observed.  We focus our analysis on wage and salary workers, that is, we 
exclude from the analysis self-employed individuals.
14  We confine our selection to 
birth cohorts between 1961 and 1978, implying that women in our sample will be aged 
between 24 and 45 years.  The reason for dropping women younger than 24 years old is 
that we want to eliminate part-time work by students.  In addition, we confine our 
analysis  to  women  living  in  households  of  five  or  fewer  members  (96.5%  of  the 
sample).  The reason for restricting our attention to women 45 and younger living in 
households of five or fewer members is that we want to have accurate information on 
                                                 
13 For a description of the CSWH and the sampling strategy, see Argimón and González, 2006. 
14 If the worker held more than one job, the analysis focuses on his main job, defined as the job in which 
the worker has a permanent contract—if he has one—, and in the case of multiple jobs with the same 
type of contract, the one for which the individual worked the largest number of days in a given year.    14 
the number and age of children, which is unavailable in the CSWH but can be obtained 
from the Spanish Municipal Registry of Inhabitants.
15  Finally, because we want to 
confine the analysis to women with a strong attachment to the labor force, we further 
restrict our sample to women who record at least three years in wage and salary work 
after having worked at least one year FT (this is the same restriction as the one used by 
CG).  This sample selection results in an unbalanced panel of 591,063 observations on 
76,025 women, of which 16,469 (21.66%) are observed working PT at some point in 
time as shown in Table 1.  The percentage of women who switch to PT at some point in 
time is higher if they are working with fixed-term contract (28.13%) than if they are 
working with permanent contract (18.68%).  Individuals are in the dataset between 3 
and 21 years, and for an average of 8 years.    
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the key covariates for the year 2006.  
The main focus of the present study is to analyze how the hourly wage trajectories vary 
by  FT  status  and  by  contract  type  (fixed-term  versus  permanent).    The  data  are 
therefore  divided  in  four  groups,  classified  by  FT  status  and  type  of  contract.
16  
Following most of the European literature, we classify a worker working PT if she 
works 30 hours or less each week, and FT if she works 31 or more hours each week.  
Among the sample under study, we find that those with permanent contracts represent 
about two thirds of the sample.  In addition, the percentage of women working in PT 
employment doves around one tenth of the sample, with a slightly higher share among 
those women working with fixed-term contracts (11% versus 9%).   
When comparing the variables for women working in PT versus FT jobs, Table 
2 shows that PT workers have lower (raw) hourly wages and their (raw) hourly wage 
                                                 
15 Information on family composition becomes noisy for older women and for women living in large 
households, but is considerably accurate relative to Census data for the sub-population of women under 
analysis (see Lacuesta and Fernandez-Kranz, 2009). 
16 Although one individual can appear under different categories in different waves of the panel, it should 
be noted that these four categories are mutually exclusive.     15 
grows at a lower rate than FT workers.
17  However, this cannot be used as a reliable 
estimate of the pay penalty that a given woman would suffer if she changed from FT to 
PT status because women working PT are very different from those working FT, as 
found in the subsequent rows of this table.  For instance, we observe that PT workers 
are less-educated, older and more likely to have children of all ages than FT workers.  
Looking at employer differences across the two groups, women in PT employment are 
concentrated in the private sector, smaller firms and blue-collar occupations (relative to 
FT workers). These findings suggest that PT workers may segregate into low-paying 
firms and  low-paying  jobs.   Finally, the  years  of experience  into FT and PT work 
highlight that there is high persistence into both FT / PT status—this result has also 
been found in other countries as found by Blank, 1998; Buddelmeyer et al., 2005; and 
Connolly and Gregory, 2008, and 2009.  Overall the observed differences for PT versus 
FT workers hold across the two types of contract.   
Compared to other datasets, our data has several advantages.  First, the CSWH 
is a very large sample, which is important because PT work and switching from FT to 
PT (and vice-versa) is a relatively infrequent event, and more so when we focus the 
analysis on women strongly attached to the labor market.  Second, the CSWH provides 
the complete labor market history for those women registered in the Social Security 
Administration  in  2006,  for  up  to  21  years.    The  length  of  the  panel  gives  the 
opportunity to trace women’s earnings trajectories for the first half of the employment 
life-cycle  in the case of older cohorts and  for substantial  periods even  for  younger 
cohorts.  Third, it contains reliable information on monthly earnings, tenure, experience 
in FT and PT work, and change of employer, as the information comes directly from 
the payroll records.  Measurement error due to recall bias or self-reporting for these key 
                                                 
17 Our measure of pay is hourly earnings, calculated as gross yearly earnings excluding pay in respect to 
overtime hours, divided by total contractual hours, deflated by the 2006 price deflator.   16 
variables  is  minimized  with  this  data  set.    Similarly,  non-response  is  not  an  issue.  
Fourth,  the  dataset  has  rich  information  on  individual  characteristics,  including 
education,  age,  ethnicity,  marital  status,  and  number  and  age  of  children  in  the 
household. 
 
V.  Methodology and Results  
Our objective is to exploit longitudinal data in Spain to analyze the direct consequences 
of PT employment on subsequent earnings, earnings growth, and career trajectories.  
Because of the striking segmentation of the Spanish labor market, we analyze the PT 
penalty by type of contract and explore the effectiveness of job protection into reducing 
the potential PT penalty. 
 
V.1. PT log hourly wage differential 
We begin our analysis by estimating the average effect of working PT on the 
hourly wage level.  Table 3 presents our estimates using a variety of approaches.  For 
ease of the exposition, we use a simple dummy variable approach to measure the log 
hourly wage differences associated with PT status, conditional on controls.
18  We begin 
by estimating the following equation using pooled OLS:  
(1)  it i it it it PT X LnW m f q b + + + =  
Here,  it LnW  is the natural log of real hourly earnings of individual i at year t;  it X  is a 
vector  of  individual  and  job  characteristics  for  individual  i  at  time  t,  with  β  the 
corresponding coefficient vector (including an intercept).  Because there has been much 
debate  on  whether  variables  that  control  for  employer  characteristics  or  change  in 
                                                 
18 This approach is similar to the one used by Hirsch, 2005; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, and CG, 
among others.  Earnings function parameters differ between PT and FT status, but the gaps in the wage 
estimated using the dummy variable approach differ little from those based on separate equations by PT 
status, and evaluated at the means.   17 
occupation  or  employers  ought  to  be  included  in  the  specification  (see  discussion 
below), we present alternative specifications to evaluate the robustness of the results.  
it PT  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker’s principal job is PT in year t.  The 
error term includes both a random component  it with mean zero and constant variance, 
and a worker-specific fixed effect i f .  All regressions use the Huber/White estimator of 
variance and allow for observations not being independent within cluster-individuals.  
Regression (1) is estimated for the whole sample (panel A), and separately for workers 
with fixed-term contract (panel B) and those with permanent contract (panel C).   
Analyzing first the pooled OLS estimates for the whole sample (first row of 
panel A), the estimate headed “unadjusted” shows that the log hourly earnings of PT 
women are, on average, 11 log points less than the log hourly earnings of FT women.  
The  subsequent  columns  estimate  the  average  PT  hourly  wage  differential  adding 
additional controls.  For instance, the second column shows that the PT penalty falls to 
3  log  points  once  we  control  for  women  socio-demographic  characteristics.    The 
inclusion of additional employer controls changes the sign of the PT penalty into a 
small premium (of up to 3 log points once all controls have been added).  These results 
are in line with evidence from other (cross-sectional) studies from other countries that 
find that the “adjusted” PT / FT differential is very small (and it is mainly explained by 
workers’ characteristics and occupational segregation).
19   
Nonetheless OLS estimates are based on a strong assumption that PT status is 
exogenous (conditional on the included covariates).  Clearly this is not the case, as 
discussed earlier in Section II.  To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we proceed to 
estimate the following fixed-effects equation (2), with results shown in row 2 of panel 
A: 
                                                 
19 See, for instance, results from Australia (Rodgers, 2004), Belgium (Jepsen, 2001; Jepsen et al., 2005), 
Norway (Hardoy and Schøne, 2006), and the UK (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008), among others.   18 
(2)   ( ) ( ) i it i it i it i it PT PT X X LnW LnW m m q b - + - + - = - ' '  
We find that the fixed-effects estimates display a PT premium in Spain that ranges 
between  6  and  8.5  log  points.    Should  we  infer  from  these  estimates  that  women 
working  PT  in  Spain  earn  higher  hourly  earnings  than  those  on  FT  work?  Not 
necessarily.    Certainly,  these  results  are  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  anecdotal 
evidence presented earlier (in Section III) suggesting that PT jobs in Spain are mainly 
involuntary in nature.  In addition, estimates from Figure 1 show that almost two thirds 
of PT workers in Spain would prefer to have a FT job, in sharp contrast with what is 
found in other European countries.   
To  our  knowledge,  three  other  studies  have  estimated  the  PT  /  FT  wage 
differential  in  Spain  using  a  cross-sectional  approach  with  data  from  the  European 
Community Household Panel Survey (Pissarides et al., 2005; and Pagán Rodríguez, 
2007) and from the 2006 Survey on Income and Living Conditions Vida (Muñoz de 
Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008).  All three studies find evidence of an unadjusted hourly 
wage penalty associated with being a female PT worker (of between 10% and 16%), 
which becomes a PT premium after adjusting for observable characteristics (and self-
selection in the case of Pagán Rodríguez, 2007) in the two studies that use the European 
Community Household Panel Survey.
20  However, the Pissarides et al.’s PT premium 
vanishes when potential measurement error in hours and PT status are instrumented 
with  lagged  values.    The  authors  conclude  that  they  are  reluctant  to  believe  their 
estimates as measurement error may still be affecting their IV estimates.
21   
Given  that  our  data  comes  from  Social  Security  records  it  ought to  be  less 
spurious than workers’ survey data overcoming the measurement error problem found 
                                                 
20 In the other study, the ‘unadjusted’ PT penalty vanishes after controlling for workers’ and job 
characteristics. 
21 The other two studies do not correct for measurement error.   19 
in  earlier  studies.    Nonetheless,  given  our  results  thus  far,  we  suspected  that  our 
measure of hours, that is, contractual hours, could be consistently underreporting actual 
worked hours for PT workers relative to FT workers, which would lead to a differential 
measurement error in contractual hours by PT status.  An explanation for this is that 
employers  have  an  incentive  to  underreport  contractual  hours  to  reduce  their  labor 
costs.  Given that PT workers tend to be in more vulnerable situations than FT workers 
(Belous,  1989;  Bardasi  and  Gornich,  2000;  Connolly  and  Gregory  2008  and  2009; 
Manning  and  Petrongolo,  2008),  and  given  the  higher  dispersion  of  hours  worked 
among PT workers compared to FT workers in Spain (Muñoz de Bustillo LLorente et 
al., 2008), underreporting of contractual hours, albeit unlawful, seems to be an easier 
and more common practice for PT contracts than FT ones.  Using data from the Time 
Use Survey, Figure 2 provides evidence that PT workers consistently work a greater 
number of hours in excess of contractual hours relative to their FT counterparts, which 
biases upwards the hourly wages of PT workers (relative to FT workers) leading to 
underestimating the PT wage penalty.
22   
One way to address this problem is to use imputed effective hours to calculate 
the hourly wage as opposed to contractual hours.
23  Rows 3 and 4 of panel A of Table 3 
show pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates using as dependent variable hourly wages 
calculated  with  imputed  effective  hours.   The  fixed-effects  estimates  show that, on 
average, women working PT in Spain earn 19 log points less per hour than their FT 
counterparts (after controlling for women socio-demographic characteristics—column 2 
row 4 of panel A).  In addition, comparing rows 3 and 4 of panel A shows that the OLS 
estimates consistently overestimate the PT penalty relative to the fixed-effect estimates 
                                                 
22 The effective-contractual hours’ gap for PT workers is significantly different from the gap for FT 
workers at the 1% level across all age and education groups. 
23 Imputed hours come from a regression of effectively worked hours against contractual hours, age, 
education, two-digit industry dummies and occupation dummies using the Spanish Time Use Survey 
Dataset.   20 
suggesting  that  women  who  move  into  PT  are  negatively  self-selected,  a  common 
finding  in this  literature.  These estimates  highlight the weaknesses of using cross-
sectional  data  for  undertaking  such  type  of  analysis.    A  priori,  our  cross-sectional 
analysis  seemed  to  offer  sound  results  consistent  with  those  found  earlier  in  the 
literature.    However,  the  availability  of  longitudinal  data  enables  us  to  further 
investigate our findings and to uncover a new identification problem, not discussed (to 
our knowledge) in the literature until now.   
The analysis thus far has analyzed the average hourly wage difference between 
women  working  PT  and  FT.    However,  the  average  effect  may  hide  important 
differences across groups.  In what follows, we study the PT hourly wage penalty by 
type of contract.  The rationale being that the effect of PT on hourly wages and the 
channels through which it operates may well differ by the level of job protection the 
worker has, and whether he is in the primary labor market (with a permanent contract) 
or in the secondary labor market (with a fixed-term contract).  For instance, low levels 
of unionization (Belous, 1989), and lower accumulation of skills and lower returns to 
skills (Connolly and Gregory, 2009; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008) are found both in 
PT jobs and ‘bad’ jobs.  In addition, Bardasi and Gornich, 2000, have found evidence 
that this association is likely to be the strongest in countries where the size of the PT 
labor market is small, that is, where PT work is more likely to be in a ‘marginalized’ 
fringe of the labor market, such as in Spain. 
Panel B and C of Table 3 replicate the analysis done in panel A but for two 
separate sub-samples.  The heterogeneity analysis shows that the average effect of PT 
work on hourly wages differs by type of contract, bringing to light that the PT penalty 
is  considerably  larger  for  workers  in  the  secondary  labor  market.    Our  preferred 
estimates (second column of rows 4) show that women with permanent contracts have,   21 
on average, 9 log points less hourly earnings than their FT counterparts.  However, the 
PT penalty  is  more than twice as  large (23  log points)  for women with  fixed-term 
contracts.    In  addition,  examining  the  results  from  panels  B  and  C  shows  that the 
negative sample selection that we are able to correct for when using fixed-effects is 
considerably larger for workers with permanent contracts.  While the PT penalty for 
workers in the primary sector gets reduced by two thirds when moving from the OLS 
estimate to the fixed-effects one (from -27 to -9 log points), it only decreases by one 
third (from -32 to -23 log points) for workers in the secondary labor market.  This 
finding may be explained by the fact that women with permanent contracts have job 
protection and are ‘free’ to move to PT work without ‘too many’ penalties.  In contrast, 
for women with fixed-term contracts their move to PT may be ‘less voluntary’.  Finally, 
we  find  that  the  reduction  of  the  differential  measurement  error  bias  is  greater  for 
women with fixed-term contract as one would expect if employers are more prone to 
under-report contractual hours among the most vulnerable workers.   
While these results highlight the existence of a PT penalty in levels in Spain, 
and show that employment protection reduces it by half, they cannot provide much 
guidance on what explains the penalty as some noise remains in the LHS variable due 
to the fact that its denominator has been imputed (notice that the estimates do not vary 
much as we control for additional covariates).
24  In what follows, we propose to analyze 
how the change in log hourly wages differs by PT status and to explore how working 




                                                 
24 As long as the noise is not related to PT status, it ought not to have an effect on our estimate of PT 
work.   22 
V.2. PT log hourly wage growth differential 
Assuming  that  differential  measurement  error  by  PT  status  is  an  individual-
employment-status fixed effect, and dropping from our sample the wage observation 
the year in which the switch from FT to PT occurs, we estimate the effect of working 
PT on the change in log hourly wages free of differential measurement error.  To do so, 
we estimate the equations (3) (OLS) and (4) (fixed-effects) below: 
(3)  ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - + + ´ + + + = D it i it it it it it it FT PT FT PT X LnW m f l g q b  
Here,  it LnW D is the change in the natural log of real hourly earnings of individual i 
between  year  t-1  and  year  t;  1 it X -   is  a  vector of  individual  and  job  characteristics 
previously described for individual i at time t-1, with β the corresponding coefficient 
vector (including an intercept).   1 - it PT  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker’s 
principal job is PT in year t-1;  1 - it FT  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker 
holds  a  fixed-term  contract  at  time  t-1.    The  error  term  includes  both  a  random 
component   it  with  mean  zero  and  constant  variance,  and  a  worker-specific  fixed 
effect i f .   All  regressions  use  the  Huber/White  estimator of  variance  and  allow  for 
observations not being independent within cluster-individuals.   
(4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i it i i i it i it i it i it i it FT PT FT PT FT FT PT PT X X LnW LnW m m l g q b - + ´ - ´ + - + - + - = D - D - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' ' ' '
  
As in equation (2), in equation (4) we identify the effect of PT work through those who 
switch status.  In contrast with estimates obtained with equations (1) and (2), in the 
regressions (3) and (4) we do not use the observation of the year the switch occurs.  
This implies that we loose those individuals for which we do not observe at least two 
consecutive periods in a given FT / PT status.  If this lost were large, it could lead to a 
problem of  sample selection.  Fortunately, the number of  individuals that we  loose   23 
because we do not observe at least two consecutive periods in a given FT / PT status is 
very small as shown in Table 4 and ought not to be a concern in terms of selection bias 
as it represents less than 1.3% of the whole sample, and less than 4% of those who 
switch to PT work at some point in the sample—notice also that only half of these we 
loose to non-employment.   
For ease of the exposition, equations (3) and (4) use a simple dummy  variable 
approach to measure the change in log wage differences associated with PT status and 
type of contract, conditional on controls.
25  While it is true that our specifications do not 
account for selection by type of contract and by PT status, by controlling for number 
and age of children and education, on the one hand, and employer characteristics, on 
the other, we are de facto controlling for the same information that many researchers 
have controlled for when using an instrumental variable approach correction.
  In the 
case of selection into FT / PT employment, most researchers use family composition 
variables to identify participation into PT employment (Blank, 1998; Pissarides et al., 
2005) arguing that these variables do not explain wages.
26   Similarly, in the case of 
selection by type of contract, researchers use employer’s characteristics, such as private 
versus public sector or firm size.
27  We find the assumption that these variables explain 
participation  but  not  wage  (or  wage  growth  in  our  case)  difficult  to  believe  and, 
therefore, prefer using the information directly in the wage equation, acknowledging 
                                                 
25 Earnings change function parameters differ between PT and FT status and type of contract, but the gaps 
in  the  wage  change  estimated  using  the  dummy  variable  approach  differ  little  from  those  based  on 
separate equations by PT status and contract type, and evaluated at the means. 
26 To identify participation into PT work in Spain, Pagán Rodríguez, 2007, uses age, level of education, 
marital status, number of children 5 years old or younger, number of children between 6 and 12 years old, 
region and household income.  He finds evidence of sample selection among women working PT (but not 
among those working FT).   
27  To  identify  participation into  fixed-term  versus  permanent  contract  in  Spain,  Hernanz, 2002,  uses 
gender, age, level of education, industry, public or private employer, firm size and region and working 
day duration (and occupation on the case of the estimation of the SES sample).  De la Rica, 2007, uses 
age, tenure and education, controls for occupation (at one-digit) and the rate of fixed-term contracts by 
autonomous community.  De la Rica, 2007, does not find evidence of selection into type of contract for 
females (while there is selection for males).  Hernanz’s estimates are not presented separately by sex, 
therefore we are unable to know whether her evidence of selection in the whole sample would hold when 
the analysis focuses on women.   24 
that selection into the different types of jobs cannot be corrected, although unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for with the fixed-effects specification. 
Table 5 presents our pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the PT penalty on 
wage  change  using  data  from  the  CSWH,  and  controlling  for  different  covariates.  
Panel A shows estimates for the whole sample, whereas Panel B shows the estimates 
for workers with fixed-term contracts and those with permanent contracts.      
  There are important differences between women with fixed-term contracts and 
those  with  permanent  contracts.    After  accounting  for  workers’  observable  and 
unobservable  characteristics  (column  3  of  Panel  B),  we  find  that  PT  women  with 
permanent contracts experience on average 2.9 log points lower hourly wage growth 
per  year  than  their  FT  counterparts,  and  that  PT  women  with  fixed-term  contracts 
experience  3.9  log  points  lower  hourly  wage  growth  per  year  than  their  FT 
counterparts.    How  large  are  these  estimates?    We  claim  that  these  estimates  are 
considerably large and concerning.  For instance, compared to the effect of education 
on  hourly  wage  growth,  we  find  that  having  a  college  degree  or  more  increases 
women’s hourly wage growth by 2 log points per year compared to women without a 
high-school degree.  Therefore, the size of the PT penalty is almost one-and-a-half that 
of the college premium among women with permanent contracts and nearly doubles 
that of the college premium among women with fixed-term contracts.  Notice also that 
the  PT  penalty  for  women  with  fixed-term  contracts  is  one  fourth  larger  (and 
statistically significantly so) than for women with permanent contracts, suggesting that 
there is a negative relationship between job protection and PT penalty. 
Also worth highlighting is the change in the estimates when moving from the 
unadjusted PT growth penalty (column 1 of Panel B) to the penalty once workers’ 
characteristics are accounted for (column 2 of Panel B), especially for women with   25 
fixed-term  contracts,  as  the  estimate  falls  more  than  one  fifth,  from  3.5  to  2.7  log 
points.
28  In addition, we also observe that the PT growth penalty rises to 3.9 log points 
for women with fixed-term contracts, once we control for unobserved heterogeneity 
(column 3 of panel B), suggesting that there is “second-order” positive selection into 
PT  work  for  women  with  fixed-term  contracts  (remember  that  the  levels  estimates 
showed the traditional “first-order” negative self-selection into PT jobs for women with 
both types of contracts).
29   
  Columns  4  and  5  show  the  inclusion  of  employer  characteristics—such  as 
whether the employer is in the public or private sector, the size of the employer, and the 
occupation—, as additional controls.  Whether to include or not such covariates in the 
specification has been the source of many academic discussions in this literature.  The 
reason is that women who work PT may segregate into jobs or occupations with low-
wage growth.  As explained by Manning and Petrongolo (2008), “if this is the case, 
controlling for such covariates will only, at best, provide an estimate of the PT penalty 
if women in PT employment are compared to those in FT employment in similar low-
wage growth jobs or occupations.  At the same time, an estimate that does not control 
for these characteristics may exaggerate the true PT penalty as part of the reason FT 
and PT women work in different jobs or occupations is the differences in the labor 
market experience they possess.”   Although controlling for employer characteristics 
has a small effect on the size of the PT penalty for both workers with fixed-term and 
permanent contracts, the story varies by type of contract.  For workers with fixed-term 
contracts,  controlling  for  employer  characteristics  (moving  from  columns  3  to  5  in 
panel B) reduces the PT penalty by 5% (the estimates falls from 3.9 to 3.7 log points).  
                                                 
28 While a decrease is also observed for women with permanent contracts, the size of the decrease is 
smaller. 
29 For workers with permanent contracts, we observe the more common negative self-selection result as 
we move from the OLS estimate to the fixed-effect one.   26 
In contrast, for workers with permanent contracts, the PT penalty increases  by 7% 
(from 2.9 to 3.1 log points).  The story for workers with fixed-term contracts is a story 
of PT workers downgrading into jobs or occupations with lower hourly wage growth.  
In contrast, for workers with permanent contracts those working PT were either already 
more concentrated in low-wage growth jobs (compared to their FT counterpart) before 
moving into PT, or when they switched to PT they moved to jobs with higher wage 
growth.   
  Columns 6 and 7 show the inclusion of industry as an additional control. Here, 
the story is the same for both types of contracts: the PT penalty is even larger if we 
control for industry.  While, on average, women in PT employment are segregated in 
industries with low-wage growth compared to their FT counterparts (as illustrated by 
the reduction in the cross-sectional estimates of the PT penalty—moving from columns 
4 to 6), the PT growth penalty increases when we move from columns 5 to 7, that is 
when  we  add  an  industry  control  to  the  specification  that  corrects  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Women switching to PT jobs either move to industries with higher wage 
growth than their FT counterparts, or they were already working in industries with low-
wage growth.  When controlling for industry, we find that the PT penalty increases by 
one fourth (more than one tenth),—from 3.7 to 4.6 log points (3.1 to 3.5 log points)—, 
for workers with fixed-term (permanent) contracts. 
  
V.3. Earnings Trajectories and the cumulative PT penalty 
Up to now, our analysis has focused on the average effect of PT work on hourly 
wages and wage growth. In this section we analyze how a switch from FT to PT work 
affects workers’ earnings trajectories, i.e., we are interested in knowing whether there is 
a PT pay penalty not only the first year after switching to PT work but also thereafter.   27 
As our results will confirm  later, it  is  interesting  for this analysis to distinguishing 
between two types of situations: whether the worker changed employer the  year of 
switching to PT work or not. 
Figure 3 shows the cumulative PT penalty by type of contract differentiating by 
whether the worker changes employer at the time of the PT switch or not (estimates of 
the key coefficients are shown in Tables 6.A and 6.B).  While panel A of Figure 3 
presents the cumulative PT penalty estimated with the specification that controls for 
workers’ characteristics, panel B shows the estimates when we control for both workers 
and employers’ characteristics. 
Focusing  first on panel  A, we  find that the return to PT experience  is  very 
different  in the primary  labor  market than  in the secondary one.   For  instance,  for 
workers with permanent contracts, the return to PT experience gives a negative return 
during  the  first  year  and  becomes  flat  thereafter.    In  contrast,  for  workers  in  the 
secondary market (those with fixed-term contract), we find that PT experience gives a 
negative return for at least the first four years.  These results are in line with Hirsch, 
2005,  and  CG  who  find  that  accumulated  skills  account  for  much  of  the  PT  wage 
disadvantage among workers in the US (the former) and the UK (the latter).  Moreover, 
similar to CG, we find that the returns to PT work are lower in lower level jobs—CG 
find lower returns to PT work for workers in lower level occupations. 
Another important insight emerges from panel A of Figure 3:  For workers with 
permanent contracts, the PT penalty is mainly explained by the change of employer at 
the time of the switch to PT work.  While no PT penalty is observed among those 
workers  who  remain  with  the  same  employer,  the  switch  to  PT  work  imposes  an   28 
immediate earnings penalty of 10 log points if the worker changes employers.
30  Such 
penalty remains in evidence over at least four years.  In addition, panel B shows that 
half of this penalty is accounted for employers’ characteristics, providing evidence of 
job downgrading. 
For workers in the secondary labor market, we also find that changing jobs with 
the switch to PT work is a further source of earnings penalty, over 10 log points, of 
which, one fourth are explained by employers’ characteristics.
31  In addition, we find 
that for workers in the secondary labor market, there is an additional penalty of 9 log 
points at the time of the switch to PT that is not explained by employer switch, nor 
other observable characteristics.  This is in addition to the further losses due to negative 
return to PT experience discussed earlier. 
To sum up, for workers in the primary labor market, we find that the PT penalty 
is explained by the change of employer and job downgrading, as well as negligible 
returns to PT work experience during the  first  few  years  in PT work.  Once these 
channels are taken into account, neither PT status nor the switch into PT is associated 
with a significant pay penalty directly.  However, these three channels do give rise to 
non-negligible earnings losses, and it takes at least four years for these penalties to 
vanish.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these results are not so different from those found in 
countries in which PT is well established, such as the UK.  In contrast, for workers in 
the  secondary  labor  market,  the  PT  penalties  are  greater  and  long-lasting,  raising 
serious concern for such workers in these types of contracts.  We find that the switch to 
PT status in itself is associated with a 10 log points immediate drop in earnings that we 
                                                 
30 These results are in line with those found by Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, for the UK, where they 
find that for those women who change hours status without changing employer there is a very small pay 
penalty of 0.2%. 
31 Note that the fact that job downgrading explains less of the PT penalty for workers with fixed-term 
contracts than for those with permanent contracts is consistent with the fact that jobs in the secondary 
labor market are already ‘bad’ jobs.   29 
are  unable  to  explain  with  workers’  observable  or  unobservable  characteristics  nor 
employers’ attributes. In addition to this unexplained PT penalty, we find evidence that 
experience  in  PT  work  is  negative.    Finally,  the  PT  penalty  is  exacerbated  by  job 
downgrading and job change. 
 
VI.  Policy implications and directions for further research 
The focus of this paper has been to study the linkage between the PT pay 
penalty and the type of contract.  The main result of the paper is that PT work feeds 
into the labor market segmentation that is caused by a dual system of job protection 
insofar the negative wage effects of working PT are larger and more persistent for 
workers in the secondary market (with fixed-term contracts).  Our estimates suggest 
that the  leeway  granted  by  job  protection  leads  to  a  less  favorable  treatment  of 
workers with weak rights, such as those with fixed-term contracts in PT jobs.  This 
result must be seen in the context of current policy proposals of adding labor market 
flexibility through the use of PT work, especially in countries with rigid and dual 
market structures.  Rather than dismissing the important role of PT work for labor 
market flexibility, we view our results as implying that PT work is a tough sell 
politically when labor markets are highly segmented (perhaps not surprisingly,  PT 
work in Spain is mostly involuntary, as 60% of women working PT say they would 
prefer a FT job).  In this regards, an important topic for future research is the study 
of transition patterns for PT workers, especially the transitions from PT to FT and 
from fixed-term to permanent contracts by work status.      
Finally, our results bring to light another dimension of gender and family pay 
gaps in segmented labor markets. Given the relative concentration of mothers in PT   30 
work, they suggests that Spain is still far from enabling the conciliation of work and 
family through the reduction of regular work schedule.      
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Table 1 
Sample Sizes 
Women Strongly Attached to the Labor Force, 1985-2006 CSWH 
(24 to 45 years old) 
(In parenthesis, as a % of the total number of individuals in each category) 
 
  Whole sample  Permanent contract 
at time t-1 
Fixed-term 
contract at time t-1 
Number of individuals  76,025  54,726  50,015 
    Of  which only work FT  59,556    (78.34%)  44,504    (81.13%)  35,947    (71.87%) 
    Of which switch to PT  16,469    (21.66%)  10,222    (18.68%)  14,068    (28.13%) 






















Descriptive Statistics  
Women Strongly Attached to the Labor Force, 2006 CSWH 
(24 to 45 years old)  
 
  Permanent contract  Fixed-term contract 
  FT worker  PT worker  FT worker  PT worker 










Log of current hourly 































































































With children older than 6 







































Experience in PT 









Experience in FT 











































Number of individuals  32,343  3,110  15,637  1,832 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All hourly wages are deflated by the gross 
domestic product (GDP) deflator (base year = 2006).  † PT mean significantly different from FT mean at 
the 90% confidence level.   37 
Table 3 
Estimation of the Part-Time Pay Penalty, Different methodologies 
Dependent variable: Ln(real hourly wage) 
 
























cs + change 
occupation 
or employer 
Panel A:  Whole sample (number of observations : 591,063) 
1.  Pooled  













2.  Fixed-   













Using imputed effective hours to estimate LHS variable 
3.  Pooled  













4.  Fixed-   













Panel B:  With fixed-term contracts (number of observations: 194,218) 
1.  Pooled  













2.  Fixed-   













Using imputed effective hours to estimate LHS variable 
3.  Pooled  













4.  Fixed-   













Panel C:  With permanent contracts (number of observations: 396,845) 
1.  Pooled  













2.  Fixed-   













Using imputed effective hours to estimate LHS variable 
3.  Pooled  













4.  Fixed-   













*** Significant at 1% level. Imputed hours come from a regression of effectively worked hours against 
contractual hours, age, education, two-digit industry and occupation using the Spanish Time Use Survey 
Dataset. A negative number indicates a penalty for part-time workers. Each set of regressions has the 
following  controls:  UNADJUSTED  –  year  and  province  dummies;  WORKERS  CONTROLS  –  age, 
education,  nationality,  province  of  residence,  experience  and  quadratic  of  experience,  tenure,  with 
children  less  than  3  and  bigger  than  6  dummies,  and  immigrant  status;  EMPLOYER 
CHARACTERISTICS – number of workers, public sector dummy; INDUSTRY & OCCUPATION – 
two-digits industry dummies and ten occupation categories dummies;  CHANGE OF EMPLOYER – a 
dummy indicating if the individual’s employer at year t is different from t-1. 38 
Figure 1 
 Full-time Job Preferences 











Contractual and Effective Hours for PT and FT Workers 
















































































































































Note: The effective-contractual hours gap for PT workers is significantly different from the gap 
for FT workers at the 1% level across all age and education groups. The effective-contractual 
hours  gap is  always  positive  for  PT  workers and negative  for  FT  workers and the  difference 
between the two groups of workers grows with age and the level of education: is -1.34 hours when 
age is between 25-34, -4.83 hours at ages 35 to 45, -1.85 hours for individuals with less than high 
































Individual Attrition in Wage Change  
(In parenthesis, as a % of the total number of individuals in each category) 
 





































276  6 
              And return to FT within one period  333 
 
48  261  4 
*Number of individuals we drop in the hourly wage change specification because we do not observe 
them for at least two consecutive years in a given employment status 40 
Table 5 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
 






















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
Panel A. Without Contract Type 














               
Panel B. By Contract Type 
Fixed-term 















               
Permanent 















               
               
Sample size   468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532 
(# individuals)  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ￿ 
indicates that the difference of the estimated effects by type of contract is significant at the 10% level.  UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, 
level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and 
cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: industry, occupation, number of workers and public sector.  41 
Figure 3. The Cumulative Part-Time Penalty by Years in Part-Time Work  







































































Number of consecutive years in part-time job
Fixed-Term Contract






































































Number of consecutive years in part-time job
Permanent Contract
No change of employer the year of switching Change of employer the year of switching
 
Note: Women 24 to 45 years old strongly attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-
difference specification with individual fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the one-year 
change in real hourly wages and controls are: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in 
part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, year, province, education, level of experience in part-
time and full-time jobs, the change in the level  of experience, tenure, number of children, with 
children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, cohabiting status, and immigrant status. Dashed 
lines represent the 5% confidence intervals of the part-time effect. The value for the first year in 
part-time job (switchers) comes from a regression where hours of work are effectively worked hours 
imputed using the Spanish Time Use Survey.   42 
 
Figure 3. The Cumulative Part-Time Penalty by Years in Part-Time Work  
PANEL B. Controlling for worker, employer and job characteristics, 







































































Number of consecutive years in part-time job
Fixed-Term Contract






































































Number of consecutive years in part-time job
Permanent Contract
No change of employer the year of switching Change of employer the year of switching
 
Note: Women 24 to 45 years old strongly attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-
difference specification with individual fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the one-year 
change in real hourly wages and controls are: worker characteristics + firm and job characteristics + 
change of occupation and change of employer. Dashed lines represent the 5% confidence intervals of 
the part-time effect. The value for the first year in part-time job (switchers) comes from a regression 
where hours of work are effectively worked hours imputed using the Spanish Time Use Survey.   43 
Table 6. A 
 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty for Workers with Fixed-Term Contract at Time t-1, 
by Experience in Part-time Work 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
  Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Fixed-effects 
 (Worker controls + employer 
characteristics + change occupation or 
employer) 
  Marginal effects  Cumulative 
effects 
Marginal effects  Cumulative 
effects 
Number of consecutive years in part-time work if no change of employer the year of the switching 




























































Number of consecutive years in part-time work if  change of employer the year of the switching 




























































Sample size   138,234  138,234  138,234  138,234 
(# individuals)  48,217  48,217  48,217  48,217 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and estimated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test).  Women 24 to 45 years old strongly 
attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-difference specification with individual fixed 
effects,  where the dependent variable is the one-year change in real hourly  wages and controls are: 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of 
contract at t-1, age, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the 
change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 
dummies,  cohabiting  status,  and  immigrant  status;  EMPLOYER  CHARACTERISTICS:  industry, 
occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
 44 
 
Table 6. B 
 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty for Workers with Permanent Contract at time t-1, 
by Experience in Part-time Work 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
 
  Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Fixed-effects 
 (Worker controls + employer 
characteristics + change occupation or 
employer) 
  Marginal effects  Cumulative 
effects 
Marginal effects  Cumulative 
effects 
Number of consecutive years in part-time work if no change of employer the year of the switching 




























































Number of consecutive years in part-time work if  change of employer the year of the switching 




























































Sample size   330,298  330,298  330,298  330,298 
(# individuals)  54,093  54,093  54,093  54,093 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and estimated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test).  Women 24 to 45 years old strongly 
attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-difference specification with individual fixed 
effects,  where the dependent variable is the one-year change in real hourly  wages and controls are: 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of 
contract at t-1, age, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the 
change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 
dummies,  cohabiting  status,  and  immigrant  status;  EMPLOYER  CHARACTERISTICS:  industry, 
occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
 
 